| Subj: | The C.I.A. and the failure of American intelligence. |
| Date: | 1/19/02 2:42:13 PM Pacific Standard Time |
| From: APFN@apfn.org (American Patriot Friends
Network) Reply-to: apfn@apfn.org To: apfn@yahoogroups.com (APFN Yahoogroups) |
|
FACT ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY WHAT WENT WRONG
The C.I.A. and the failure of American
intelligence.
http://disc.server.com/Indices/149495.html
by SEYMOUR M.
HERSH
Issue of 2001-10-08 Posted 2001-10-01
After more than
two weeks of around-the-clock investigation into the
Septem-
ber 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
the American intelligence community remains confused,
divid-
ed, and unsure about how the terrorists operated,
how many
there were, and what they might do next.
It was that lack
of solid information, government officials told me, that
was
the key factor behind the Bush
Administration's decision
last week not to issue a promised white paper
listing the
evidence linking Osama bin Laden's
organization to the
attacks.
There is consensus within the government
on two issues:
the terrorist attacks were brilliantly planned and executed,
and the intelligence community was in no
way prepared to
stop them. One bureaucratic victim, the officials
said, may
be George Tenet, the director of the
Central Intelligence
Agency, whose resignation is considered a necessity by
many
in the Administration. "The system
is after Tenet," one
senior officer told me. "It wants to get rid of
him."
The investigators are
now split into at least two
factions. One, centered in the F.B.I.,
believes that the
terrorists may not have been "a cohesive
group," as one
involved official put it, before they started
training and
working together on this operation. "These guys
look like a
pickup basketball team," he said. "A bunch of guys
who got
together." The F.B.I. is still
trying to sort out the
identities and backgrounds of the hijackers.
The fact is,
the official acknowledged, "we don't know much about
them."
These investigators suspect that the suicide
teams were
simply lucky. "In your wildest dreams, do
you think they
thought they'd be able to pull off four
hijackings?" the
official asked. "Just taking out one
jet and getting it
into the ground would have been a success.
These are not
supermen." He explained that the most
important advantage
the hijackers had, aside from the element of
surprise, was
history: in the past, most hijackings had ended up safely
on
the ground at a Third World airport, so
pilots had been
trained to covperate.
Another view, centered in the Pentagon
and the C.I.A.,
credits the hijackers with years of
advance planning and
practice, and a deliberate
after-the-fact disinformation
campaign. "These guys were below everybody's
radar they're
professionals," an official said. "There's
no more than
five or six in a cell. Three men will know the
plan; three
won't know. They've been 'sleeping' out there for
years and
years." One military planner told me that many
of his col-
leagues believe that the terrorists "went
to ground and
pulled phone lines" well before September
11th that is,
concealed traces of their activities. It is widely
believed
that the terrorists had a support team, and the
fact that
the F.B.I. has been unable to track down
fellow-conspira-
tors who were left behind in the United States
is seen as
further evidence of careful planning.
"Look," one person
familiar with the investigation said. "If it were
as simple
and straightforward as a lucky one-off
oddball operation,
then the seeds of confusion would not have been sown
as they
were."
Many of the investigators
believe that some of the
initial clues that were uncovered
about the terrorists'
identities and preparations, such as flight
manuals, were
meant to be found. A former high-level
intelligence offi-
cial told me, "Whatever trail was left was left
deliberate-
lyfor the F.B.I. to chase."
In interviews over the past
two weeks, a number of
intelligence officials have raised questions about Osama
bin
Laden's capabilities. "This guy sits in a cave
in Afghanis-
tan and he's running this operation?" one
C.I.A. official
asked. "It's so huge. He couldn't have
done it alone." A
senior military officer told me that because of
the visas
and other documentation needed to infiltrate
team members
into the United States a major foreign intelligence
service
might also have been involved. "To get somebody
to fly an
airplane to kill himself," the official added, further
sug-
gests that "somebody paid his family a hell
of a lot of
money."
"These people are not necessarily all
from bin Laden,"
a Justice Department official told me. "We're still
running
a lot of stuff out," he said, adding that the
F.B.I. has
been inundated with leads. On September 23rd,
Secretary of
State Colin Powell told a television interviewer
that "we
will put before the world, the American people, a persuasive
case" showing that bin Laden was responsible
for the at-
tacks. But the widely anticipated white paper could
not be
published, the Justice Department official said, for
lack of
hard facts. "There was not enough to make a
sale."
The Administration justified the
delay by telling the
press that most of the information was classified and
could
not yet be released. Last week, however,
a senior C.I.A.
official confirmed that the intelligence community
had not
yet developed a significant amount
of solid information
about the terrorists' operations, financing, and
planning.
"One day, we'll know, but at the moment we don't
know," the
official said.
"To me," he added, "the scariest
thing is that these
guys" the terrorists "got the first one
free. They knew
that the standard operating procedure in an aircraft
hijack-
ing was to play for time. And they knew for sure
that after
this the security on airplanes was going to go
way up. So
whatever they've planned for the next
round they had in
place already."
The concern about a
second attack was repeated by
others involved in the investigation. Some
in the F.B.I.
now suspect that the terrorists are following
a war plan
devised by the convicted conspirator Ramzi Ahmed Yousef,
who
is believed to have been the mastermind of the
1993 World
Trade Center bombing. Yousef was involved
in plans that
called for, among other things, the releasing of
poisons in
the air and the bombing of the tunnels between New York
City
and New Jersey. The government's concern
about the poten-
tial threat from hazardous-waste haulers was
heightened by
the Yousef case.
"Do they go chem/bio in one, two, or three
years?" one
senior general asked rhetorically.
"We must now make a
difficult transition from reliance on law enforcement
to the
prekmptive. That part is hard. Can we recruit
enough good
people?" In recent years, he said, "we've been
hiring kids
out of college who are computer geeks." He continued,
"This
is about going back to deep, hard dirty
work, with tough
people going down dark alleys with good
instincts."
Today's C.I.A. is not up to the
job. Since the break-
up of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the
C.I.A. has become
increasingly bureaucratic and unwilling to take
risks, and
has promoted officers who shared such
values. ("The con-
sciousness of kind," one former officer says.) It has
stead-
ily reduced its reliance on overseas human
intelligence and
cut the number of case officers abroad members of the
clan-
destine service, now known formally as the
Directorate of
Operations, or D.O., whose mission is to recruit
spies. (It
used to be called the "dirty tricks"
department.) Instead,
the agency has relied on liaison relationships reports
from
friendly intelligence services and police departments
around
the worldand on technical collection
systems.
It won't be easy to
put agents back in the field.
During the Cold War, the agency's most important mission
was
to recruit spies from within the Soviet Union's military
and
its diplomatic corps. C.I.A.
agents were assigned as
diplomatic or cultural officers at
American embassies in
major cities, and much of their work could be done at
diplo-
matic functions and other social events. For an
agent with
such cover, the consequence of being
exposed was usually
nothing more than expulsion from the host country and
tempo-
rary reassignment to a desk in Washington. Today,
in Afgha-
nistan, or anywhere in the Middle East or
South Asia, a
C.I.A. operative would have to speak the local
language and
be able to blend in. The operative should
seemingly have
nothing to do with any Americans, or
with the American
embassy, if there is one. The status is
known inside the
agency as "nonofficial cover," or NOC. Exposure
could mean
death.
It's possible that there isn't a
single such officer
operating today inside Islamic-fundamentalist
circles. In
an essay published last summer in
The Atlantic Monthly,
Reuel Marc Gerecht, who served for nearly a decade as
a case
officer in the C.I.A.'s Near East
Division, quoted one
C.I.A. man as saying, "For Christ's sake, most
case offic-
ers live in the suburbs of Virginia. We don't do
that kind
of thing." Another officer told Gerecht,
"Operations that
include diarrhea as a way of life don't
happen."
At the same time, the D.O.
has been badly hurt by a
series of resignations and
retirements among high-level
people, including four men whose names are little
known to
the public but who were widely
respected throughout the
agency: Douglas Smith, who spent thirty-one
years in the
clandestine service; William Lofgren, who at his retirement,
in 1996, was chief of the Central Eurasia
Division; David
Manners, who was chief of station in Amman, Jordan,
when he
left the agency, in 1998; and Robert Baer, an Arabic
speaker
who was considered perhaps the best
on-the-ground field
officer in the Middle East. All
left with feelings of
bitterness over the agency's procedures for running
clandes-
tine operations.
"We'll never solve the terrorism issue
until we recon-
stitute the D.O.," a former senior clandestine officer
told
me. "The first line of defense, and the most
crucial line
of defense, is human intelligence." Baer, who was
awarded a
Career Intelligence Medal after his
resignation, in late
1997, said, "You wouldn't believe how bad it is.
What saved
the White House on Flight 93" the plane
that crashed in
Pennsylvania "was a bunch of rugby players.
Is that what
you're paying thirty billion dollars for?" He was
referring
to the federal budget for intelligence.
He and his col-
leagues aren't surprised that the F.B.I. had no
warning of
the attack. "The bureau is wonderful
in solving crimes
after they're committed," one C.I.A. man
said. "But it's
not good at penetration. We've got to do
it."
Today, the C.I.A. doesn't
have enough qualified case
officers to man its many stations
and bases around the
world. Two retired agents have
been brought back on a
rotating basis to take temporary charge of the small
base in
Karachi, Pakistan, a focal point for
terrorist activity.
(Karachi was the site of the murder, in 1995, of two
Ameri-
cans, one of them a C.I.A. employee, allegedly
in retalia-
tion for the arrest in Pakistan of Ramzi Ahmed
Yousef.) A
retired agent also runs the larger C.I.A. station
in Dacca,
Bangladesh, a Muslim nation that could be a
source of re-
cruits. Other retirees run C.I.A. stations
in Africa.
One hard question is what lengths the
C.I.A. should go
to. In an interview, two former operations
officers cited
the tactics used in the late nineteen-eighties by the
Jorda-
nian security service, in its successful
effort to bring
down Abu Nidal, the Palestinian who led what was at the
time
"the most dangerous terrorist organization
in existence,"
according to the State Department. Abu
Nidal's group was
best known for its role in two bloody gun and
grenade at-
tacks on check-in desks for El Al, the Israeli
airline, at
the Rome and Vienna airports in December,
1985. At his
peak, Abu Nidal threatened the life
of King Hussein of
Jordan whom he called "the pygmy king" and the King
respond-
ed, according to the former intelligence officers, by
tell-
ing his state security service, "Go get
them."
The Jordanians did not move directly
against suspected
Abu Nidal followers but seized close family members
instead
mothers and brothers. The Abu Nidal suspect
would be ap-
proached, given a telephone, and told to call
his mother,
who would say, according to one C.I.A. man,
"Son, they'll
take care of me if you don't do what they
ask." (To his
knowledge, the official carefully added, all
the suspects
agreed to talk before any family
members were actually
harmed.) By the early
nineteen-nineties, the group was
crippled by internal dissent and was no longer a significant
terrorist organization. (Abu Nidal, now in his
sixties and
in poor health, is believed to be living quietly in
Egypt.)
"Jordan is the one nation that totally succeeded
in pene-
trating a group," the official added.
"You have to get
their families under control."
Such tactics defy the American rule of
law, of course,
and the C.I.A.'s procedures, but, when it comes to Osama
bin
Laden and his accomplices, the official insisted,
there is
no alternative. "We need to do this knock them
down one by
one," he said. "Are we serious about
getting rid of the
problem instead of sitting around making diversity
quilts?"
A few days after the
attacks, Vice-President Dick
Cheney defended the C.I.A.'s director,
George Tenet, on
television, saying that it would be a "tragedy" to
look for
"scapegoats." President Bush subsequently added
a note of
support with a visit to C.I.A. headquarters.
In an inter-
view last week, one top
C.I.A. official also defended
Tenet. "We know there's a lot of
Monday-morning quarter-
backing going on, but people don't understand the conditions
that George inherited," he told me. "You can't
penetrate a
six-man cell when they're brothers and cousins no matter
how
much Urdu you know." The official acknowledged
that there
was much dissatisfaction with the C.I.A.'s
performance, but
he said, "George has not gotten any word other than that
the
President has full confidence in him." He went
on, "George
wouldn't resign in a situation like this."
I was informed by other officials,
however, that Te-
net's days are numbered. "They've told him he's
on his way
out," one official said. "He's trying
to figure it out
whether to go gracefully or let it appear as if
he's going
to be fired." A White House
adviser explained Cheney's
public endorsement of Tenet by saying, "In Washington,
your
friends always stab you in the chest. Somebody
has to take
the blame for this." It was his
understanding, he added,
that "after a decent interval whenever they get
some trac-
tion on the problem he will depart. I've heard
three to six
months." Even one of Tenet's close friends told
me, "He's
history."
Tenet's standing was further undermined,
after Septem-
ber 11th, by what proved to have been a
series of wildly
optimistic claims about the effectiveness of
the C.I.A.'s
Counter Terrorism Center, which was set up in 1986
after a
wave of international bombings, airplane
hijackings, and
kidnappings. The idea was to bring
together experts from
every American police agency, including the Secret
Service,
into a "fusion center," which would covrdinate
intelligence
data on terrorism. In October, 1998, after four
men linked
to bin Laden were indicted for their role in the bombings
at
the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya,
reporters for
Newsweek were given a tour of the center. The
indictments,
Newsweek reported, "were intended as a clear message
to bin
Laden and his fugitive followers: the United
States knows
who they are and where to find them.. ..
The story of how
the C.I.A. and F.B.I., once bitter
bureaucratic rivals,
collaborated to roll up bin Laden's elusive
network is a
tale of state-of-the-art sleuthingand just plain
luck."
But in fact the C.T.C. was
not authorized to recruit
or handle agents overseas that task was left
to the D.O.
and its stations in the Middle East, which
had their own
priorities. The C.T.C. was bolstered
with more money and
more manpower after the World Trade Center bombing in
1993,
but it remained a paper-shuffling unit whose
officers were
not required to be proficient in foreign languages.
Many of
the C.I.A.'s old hands have told me that the C.T.C.,
despite
its high profile, was not an assignment of
choice for a
young and ambitious D.O. officer. The
C.T.C. and two of
the other major intelligence centers dealing with
narcotics
and nuclear-nonproliferation issues
are so consumed by
internecine warfare that the professional analysts
find it
difficult to do their jobs. "They're
all fighting among
each other," said one senior manager who took early
retire-
ment and whose last assignment was as the director of
one of
the centers. "There's no concentration on
issues."
In 1986, Robert Baer, freshly arrived
as a case officer
from Khartoum, was drafted into the Counter
Terrorism Cen-
ter, a few months after it was set up,
by its director,
Duane (Dewey) Clarridge. A draft of a
memoir Baer wrote,
which will be published by Crown this
fall, depicts what
happened next:
The first few months was about as
exhilarating as it
can get in the spy business. Dewey had authority
to pretty
much do anything he wanted against the
terrorists. He had
all the money he wanted.. ..
It wasn't long, though,
before the politics of intelligence
undermined everything
Dewey tried to do.. .. It was
too risky. A botched or
even a successful operation would piss off a
friendly for-
eign government. Someone would be thrown
out of his cushy
post. Someone could even get killed..
.. You'd ask [the
C.I.A. station in] Bonn to recruit a few Arabs
and Iranians
to track the Middle East imigri community in
West Germany,
and it would respond that it didn't have
enough officers.
You'd ask Beirut to meet a certain agent traveling to
Leba-
non, and it would refuse because of some
security problem.
It was nothing but bureaucratic foot-dragging, but it
effec-
tively hamstrung anything Dewey tried to
do. After six
months, Dewey could put his hands on only two Arabic
speak-
ers another officer and me.
Many people in the intelligence
community, in their
conversations with me, complained bitterly about how
diffi-
cult it was to work with the Directorate of Operations,
even
during a crisis. "In order to work on a problem
with D.O.,"
a former senior scientist told me, "you have to be in
D.O."
Similarly, a congressional observer of the
C.I.A. came to
understand the bureaucratic power of the D.O.
"To succeed
as director of Central Intelligence," he said, "you
have to
ingratiate yourself with the D.O." Other intelligence
sourc-
es have told me that the D.O.'s machinations
led, at one
point, to a feud with the National Security Agency
over who
would control the Special Collection Service, a joint
under-
taking of the two agencies that deploys teams of electronics
specialists around the world to monitor diplomatic and
other
communications in moments of crisis. The
S.C.S.'s highly
secret operations, which produced some of
the Cold War's
most valuable data, are usually run from secure sites
inside
American embassies. Competence
and sophistication were
hindered by an absurd amount of bickering.
A military man
who in 1998 was involved in a Middle
East signals-intel-
ligence operation told me that he was not able
to discuss
the activity with representatives of the
C.I.A. and the
N.S.A. at the same time. "I used
to meet with one in a
safe house in Virginia, break for lunch, and then meet
with
the other," the officer said. "They wouldn't be
in the same
room."
If the current crisis does lead
to an overhaul of the
agency, the Senate and House intelligence committees
are not
likely to be of much help. Lofgren,
Smith, Manners, and
Baer, among others, repeatedly met
with legislators and
their staffs and testified before Congress in an
effort to
bring about changes. But nothing was
done.
Not surprisingly, Republicans and
Democrats have dif-
fering explanations for what went
wrong. One Republican
staff member said that Senator Richard C. Shelby,
of Alaba-
ma, who was the committee's chairman until early this
year,
understood that the problem was at the top of
the agency.
"We do have guys in the field with great ideas
who are not
supported by the establishment," the staff member
said. But
none of the senior Democrats, he said, wanted to
embarrass
the director, George Tenet, by holding an inquiry
or hear-
ings into the various complaints. (Tenet
had spent years
working for the Democrats on the committee
staff, and had
served as a member of Bill
Clinton's National Security
Council staff before joining the C.I.A.'s management
team.)
One Democrat, however, blamed the
process within the
Senate committee, which, he said,
neglected terrorism in
favor of more politically charged
issues. "Tenet's been
briefing about bin Laden for years, but we weren't organized
to consider what are threats to the United
States. We're
chasing whatever the hell is in the news at the
moment."
Former Senator Bob Kerrey, of Nebraska,
who served for
four years as the Intelligence Committee's ranking
Democrat
and is now the president of the New School, in New
York, is
one of Tenet's defenders. But Kerrey also acknowledges
that
he no longer knows "how well we did our job" of
legislative
oversight. "Nobody with any responsibility
can walk away
from this. We missed something
here."
Kerrey remains angry about
the U.S. policy toward
Afghanistan in the years after its defeat
of the Soviet
Union. "The Cold War was over, and we shut
down Afghanis-
tan" that is, ceased all intelligence
operations. "From
Bush to Clinton, what happened is one of the most
embarrass-
ing American foreign-policy decisions, as bad as
Vietnam,"
Kerrey said. He cited a botched 1996 C.I.A.
plot to over-
throw President Saddam Hussein of Iraq: "We also had
a half-
baked Iraqi operation and sent a
signal that we're not
serious."
Last June, Shelby, after a tour of the
Persian Gulf and
a series of intelligence briefings, told a
Washington Post
reporter that bin Laden was "on the run, and I think
he will
continue to be on the run, because we are not going
to let
up." He went on, "I don't think you could say
he's got us
hunkered down. I believe he's more
hunkered down." After
the bombing, however, Shelby was among the first to
suggest
publicly that it was time for Tenet to go. "I think
he's a
good man, and he's done some good things,
but there have
been a lot of failures on his watch," Shelby told USA
Today.
Tenet, he said, lacked "the stature
to control all the
agencies. In a sense, he is in charge, but in
reality he's
not."
One friend and former colleague
of Tenet's says that
his refusal to urge the Senate leadership to deal
with the
hard issues was symptomatic of
his problems as C.I.A.
director. "He's a politician, too,"
that person said of
Tenet. "That's why he shouldn't have been there,
because he
had no status to tell the senators, 'You
don't know what
you're talking about.' "
In his memoir, Robert Baer
describes the "fatal ma-
laise" that came over the Paris station of the
C.I.A. in
the early nineties: "Case officers weren't
recruiting new
agents. The agents already on the books were
old. They'd
lost their access. And no one seemed to care."
Many in the
agency were shocked in early 1992 when Milton
Bearden, the
head of the Soviet-East European division he had also
played
a major role in the C.I.A.'s support for the
Afghan rebels
in their brutal war against the Soviet Union
informed his
overseas stations that Russia would now be treated
like any
other friendly nation, such as
Germany or France. The
C.I.A. was no longer in the business of
recruiting agents
to spy against the Russians. In addition,
C.I.A. surveil-
lance apartments were closed
and wiretaps turned off
throughout the Middle East and Europe.
"We'll never know
the losses we had in terms of not capitalizing on the
Soviet
collapse," a retired official
said. Former high-level
Soviet officials with intelligence information or other
data
were rebuffed. "Walk-ins were turned away.
It was stun-
ning, and, as far as I knew, nobody fought
it."
Little changed when Bill Clinton took
office, in 1993.
Baer, now assigned, at his request,
to the tiny C.I.A.
outpost in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, near the
Afghanistan bor-
der, watched helplessly as Saudi-backed Islamic
fundamental-
ists the precursors of the Taliban
consolidated training
bases and began to recruit supporters and
run operations
inside the frontier nations of the former Soviet
Union.
In 1995, the agency was widely
criticized after the
news came out that a paid informant in Guatemala
had been
involved in the murders of an American
innkeeper and the
Guatemalan husband of an American lawyer. The informant
had
been kept on the C.I.A. payroll even though his
activities
were known to the Directorate of Operations.
John Deutch,
the C.I.A.'s third director in three years, responded
to the
abuses, and to the public outcry, by
issuing a directive
calling for prior approval from
headquarters before any
person with criminal or human-rights
problems could be
recruited. The approval, Deutch later explained,
was to be
based on a simple balancing test: "Is the potential
gain in
intelligence worth the cost that might be
associated with
doing business with a person who may be a
murderer?"
The "scrub order," as it came to be known,
was promul-
gated by Deutch and his colleagues with the best
of inten-
tions, and included provisions for case-by-case
review. But
in practice hundreds of
"assets" were indiscriminately
stricken from the C.I.A.'s payroll,
with a devastating
effect on anti-terrorist operations in the Middle
East.
The scrub order led to the
creation of a series of
screening panels at C.I.A.
headquarters. Before a new
asset could be recruited, a C.I.A. case officer
had to seek
approval from a Senior Review Panel. "It
was like a car-
diologist in California deciding whether a
surgeon in New
York City could cut a chest open," a
former officer re-
called. Potential agents were being assessed
by officials
who had no firsthand
experience in covert operations.
("Americans hate intelligence just hate
it," Robert Baer
recalls thinking.) In the view of the operations
officers,
the most important weapons in the war against
international
terrorism were being evaluated by men and women who,
as one
of the retired officers put it, "wouldn't drive
to a D.C.
restaurant at night because they were afraid of
the crime
problem."
Other bureaucratic panels
began "multiplying like
rabbits, one after another," a former station
chief said.
Experienced officers who were adamant about
continuing to
recruit spies found that obtaining approval before
making a
pitch had become a matter of going from committee to
commit-
tee. "In the old days, they'd say,
'Go get them,' " the
retired officer said. Yet another review process,
known as
A.V.S. the asset-validation system was put in place.
Anoth-
er retired officer told me, "You'd have to
write so much
paper that guys would spend more time in the station
writing
reports than out on the street."
"It was mindless," a third
officer said. "Look, we
recruited assholes. I handled
bad guys. But we don't
recruit people from the Little Sisters of
the Poor they
don't know anything." He went on, "What we've done
to our-
selves is criminal. There are a half-dozen
good guys out
there trying to keep it together."
"It did make the workday
a lot easier," Robert Baer
said of the edict. "I just watched CNN. No
one cared." The
C.I.A.'s vital South Group, made up of
eight stations in
central Asia all threatened by fundamentalist organizations,
especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with links
to the
Taliban and bin Laden had no agents by
the mid-nineteen-
nineties, Baer said. "The agency was going
away."
Unlike many senior officials at
C.I.A. headquarters,
Baer had lived undercover, in the
nineteen-eighties, in
Beirut and elsewhere in the Middle East, and he well
under-
stood the ability of terrorist organizations to cover
their
tracks. He told me that when the
C.I.A. started to go
after the Islamic Jihad, a radical Lebanese group
linked to
a series of kidnappings in the Reagan
years, "its people
systematically went through documents all over Beirut,
even
destroying student records. They had the airport
wired and
could pick the Americans out. They knew whom they
wanted to
kidnap before he landed." The terrorists
coped with the
American ability to intercept
conversations worldwide by
constantly changing codes often
doing little more than
changing the meanings of commonly used phrases.
"There's a
professional cadre out there," Baer said. Referring
to the
terrorists who struck on September 11th,
he said, "These
people are so damned
good."
________________________________________________________________
FBI Advises Security Review Of Web
Content
http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?id=149495&article=16555
USA UNDER
ATTACK
http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?id=149495&article=16546
`In a time of universal deceit - telling the truth is a revolutionary
act.'
http://disc.server.com/Indices/149495.html